Como a independência do judiciário e a accountability judicial afetam a percepção de corrupção na América Latina?
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.32870/cl.v1i26.7943Keywords:
Perception of Corruption, Judicial Independence, Judicial Accountability, Latin AmericaAbstract
Is the perception of corruption affected by the degree of independence and judicial accountability? Two hypotheses are tested: a. the more independent the judiciary, the lower the perception of corruption; b. the greater the degree of judicial accountability, the lower the perception of corruption. Data were collected for the eighteen countries in Latin America, with the timeframe between 2003 and 2012. Therefore, the analysis requires a specific study for panel data. The regressions of the empirical model use three different functions - fixed, random and pooled effects - which help to decide which statistical model is the most suitable for the available data. The result of the regression with random effect, indicates that there is a statistically significant effect for the two independent variables, following what the literature indicates. The results are important because they point to the need to revisit theories and new statistical models.References
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